Introduction and Summary
We study in this paper stationary competitive equilibria in an economy with fiat money, one non-durable commodity, infinitely many discretetime periods, no credit or futures markets, and a measure space of "nonhomogeneous" agents-who can differ in their preferences and in the distributions of their (random) endowments. These agents are immortal, and hold money in order to effect the random fluctuations in their endowments.! In the aggregate, these fluctuations offset each other, and equilibrium prices are constant.
OUf two central issues here are time and uncertainty; we carry out an equilibrium analysis that focuses only on consumption, distribution of wealth, and price formation. From this point of view, the production of the commodity (units of which the agents receive as endowments, from period to period) is assumed to be determined exogenously. Furthermore, in the setup considered here, money can only be hoarded; one can indeed envisage a slightly modified framework in which every agent, in addition to hoarding his money, can also put it in a savings account or invest it in some risky asset(s). Such a framework appears in a series of papers by W. Whitt (1975.a-d) , again in a setup without active consideration ofthe institutions associated with these possibilities (banking, stock exchange). In the interest of concreteness, we have preferred to keep the model as simple as possible, in order to concentrate on the above-mentioned features only. We hope that in the future we shall be able to build on this work, and try to capture (and to describe endogenously) additional desirable features such as loan markets, interest rates, insurance, overlapping generations, and the like. This paper concentrates on the basic mathematical analysis of a class of infinite horizon stochastic strategic market games. Because there is a continuum of agents each with no influence on price the analysis is close to that of competitive equilibrium. However it is noted that we present a well defined process model with an active role for fiat money. The equilibrium solution considered is more accurately described as a type symmetric noncooperative equilibrium which coincides with a competitive equilibrium.
As the model defined provides a full description of process we hope to be able to consider its dynamics as well as its stationarity properties. In this paper, however we limit our main observations to equilibrium.
A natural economic extension to the model presented here is to permit borrowing and lending. When this is done a money rate of interest may be formed endogenously. If this rate is positive there will be an incentive to lend rather than to hoard money as a means of preserving buying power from period to period. However in a truly dynamic game of strategy with borrowing it is possible that the system could attain a state where a borrower is unable to pay the amount he has promised to pay. In such a circumstance in order to well define the game, bankruptcy, settlement and reorganization rules must be specified as part of the game. This is not just an institutional comment, but a logical necessity. There may be many ways to define these extra rules. A priori it is not clear that there is a unique optimal rule. The existence of a stationary wealth distribution and optimal policy established here involves much of the population inventorying money from period to period. This changes considerably with the introduction of loan markets. In a projected separate expository paper the economic motivation is presented in more detail together with several examples including models with loan markets and a cyclical supply of the commodity.
In this paper by limiting our concern to one commodity we have been able to obtain not only existence but also the uniqueness of equilibrium in some limited instances. As soon as there are two or more goods this no longer holds true. A natural extension of this work is to consider both experimental games and behavioral simulations to see if there is any tendency and any reasons why one attractor is selected over others.
The Model
In order to describe our model, let us start with an index set I = [0, 00) and a non-atomic probability measure <p on it, representing a collection of agents and the "spatial" distribution on this collection, respectively. Each agent", E I has a utility function u'" : [0,00) --> [0,00) with u"'(O) = 0 which is increasing, concave and continuously differentiable, and has finite right-hand derivative at the origin. At the beginning of the nth period of play, agent", has an amount S;:_l(W) of wealth in fiat money, and may choose to "bid" an amount b;:(w) E [0, S;:-l (w) ]; for this, he receives found in the nth period, and the total amount bid by the agents in that period is (Ll) Bn(w) = l b::(w) 
rj>(da).
Then the agents' random endowments {Yn"'(W)}"'EI are announced for the period t = n, denominated in units of the commodity. We shall assume that the total endowment
is non-random and constant from period to period, whereas for each agent In this analysis we limit our concern to pure strategies. For consideration of some of the measure theoretic difficulties see Dubey and Shapley (1980, 1992) .
A strategy 7r" for agent a E I determines the bids b:; for every n EN. A collection of strategies II = {7r"}"EI, together with the given distributions, {A"}"EI for the random endowments of different agents and the equations (1.1)-(1.4), determines the joint distribution of all the random variables that we have introduced. In particular, the expected total reward E [v"(w)] is determined for every agent a E I, and We have a well-defined stochastic game.
For any collection II of strategies as above, consider the sequence of random measures
which describe the distribution of wealth in the various time periods n = 0,1,2, ....
We say that a collection IT = {ira}"El ofstrategies results in a stationary competitive equilibrium (p, 1-'), where p E (0,00) and I-' belongs to the space M of probability measures on [0,00), if (i) with Po = P,1I0 = I-' we have pn == p,lIn == 1-', 'Vn EN, and (1.8)
(ii) ira maximizes ETC" Z=:;:'=o,8nua(b~+l(w)/p) over all strategies 7r a for a E I
Outline of Results
We shall construct explicitly such a stationary competitive equilibrium in section 7, by first analyzing in considerable detail the individual agent's optimization (Dynamic Programming) problem with pn == p E (0,00) fixed from period to period. We set the stage for this analysis in section 2, where we define the single-agent optimization problem, study some of its elementary properties and discuss a few examples that can be solved fairly explicitly. The analysis of the Dynamic Programming Equation
namely, of the value function V"'(s;p) and the optimal (stationary) consumption policy c" '(s;p) , is carried out in sections 3 and 4. 2 Under the conditions (1.10) on the distribution),"', we are able to obtain very precise information about c" '(.;p) , which in turn leads to the existence of a unique invariant measure for the associated Markov Chain {s~(w)}~o given by
In addition, this invariant measure is shown to have finite first moment. Section 5 is devoted to the case when the utility function u'" is strictly increasing on all of (0,00). Section 6 treats the case when there is a finite
The analysis is quite interesting in itself as an instance of a discounted, infinite-horizon dynamic programming problem, where the ergodic behavior of the resulting optimally controlled Markov Chain as in (1.10) is analyzed in detail.
Finally, once this analysis has been carried out, a simple aggregation of the various ergodic measures Jl'" via the formula
is easily shown (in section 7) to lead to the stationary competitive equilibria (p,Jl(.;p) ),p E (0,00); cf. Theorems 7.3, 7.6, and Remark 7.7 for the details.
Relevant Literature
The intellectual progenitor of this work is the unpublished paper of W. Whitt (1975.d) , which considers the "homogeneous case" u'" == u,),'" == 2We have changed notation from b for bid to c to emphasize consumption.
>-(a E 1) and seeks stationary competitive equilibrium (defined in a sense slightly weaker than ours) as a fixed point in (0,=) X M for the system of equations (1.13) (1.14)
In this work, we have taken a different tack, namely, we construct a solution to (1.12), (1.13) by first studying in detail the ergodic behavior of the individual Markov Chain as in (1.10); cf. Theorem 7.3. The "nonhomogeneous" versions of these equations are then studied by aggregating as in (1.11) the invariant measures across classes of agents; cf. Theorem 7.6.
Related work on stationary competitive Markov equilibria-always using fixed-point methods-has been carried out in Lucas (1978 Lucas ( ), (1980 , Shubik (1986) , Bewley (1986) , and Duffie et al. (1988) , among others.
One-person dynamic programming problems, similar to that of sections 2-4, have been treated by several people including Hakansson (1970) , Whitt (1975. a-c) , Yaari (1976) , Schechtman (1976) , Schechtwan and Escudero (1977) , Mendelssohn and Sobel (1980) ; see also the survey paper of Deaton (1991) .
2 Preliminaries for the One-Person Game, and Simple Examples.
Consider a single agent, operating in a one-commodity economy, who seeks to maximize his total discounted utility during an infinite stage game byoptimally dividing current wealth between immediate consumption and savings for the future. We formulate the problem as a dynamic programming (or Markov decision) problem with the following ingredients: 
Here Y is a nonnegative random variable with a given distribution >., which represents the agent's income for the period in units of the commodity. We assume°< m := EY = Jo oo y>.(dy) < 00.
(2.6) The discount factor f3 E (0,1).
A plan 11" is a sequence (rro,1rl,"') where 1T"n chooses the action an on the nth day based on the history 'Sn = (so,ao,s"a" ... ,sn-"a n -"sn) of previous actions and states. The agent seeks a plan 1r which will maximize the total expected discounted utility.
For simplicity we set the price p equal to 1. There is no real loss of generality, since this amounts to redefining the utility function and the income variable Y (see also Remark 4.6). With this assumption, the motion formula of the system becomes (2.7) n = 0,1, ... ,
where Y == Yo, Yi, ... are independent and have the same distribution >..
A plan 1r, together with this law of motion, determines the distribution of the process so, ao, SI, a" ..., and we define the return function for 1r to be (2.8)
The optimal return or value junction is defined by (2.9)
A plan tr is optimal, if V = I(tr).
If u is bounded, then our problem is a discounted dynamic programming problem as in Blackwell (1965) . Even if u is unbounded, we shall see that many of Blackwell's techniques can be successfully adapted.
First, introduce the n-day return from a policy tr as (2.10) and the n-day optimal return (2.11) 
O~a:$:S and that the V n can be calculated by "backward induction" from the formulas (2.13)
O,Sa5 s
Introduce, as in Blackwell (1965) , the operator T defined for Borel functions Here is a characterization of optimal stationary plans which is well-known for u bounded (Theorem 6 of Blackwell (1965)).
Theorem:
For a stationary plan 1f with consumption function c, the following conditions are equivalent:
T(I(1f)) = I(1f)
.
For any stationary plan 1f corresponding to a consumption function c, it follows from the definition of I(1f) in (2.8) that can be rewritten as
Iterate to get, for n = 1,2, ..., in conjunction with Lemma 2.1(a):
as n --+ 00. Hence, V:S; 1 (,,) . The opposite inequality is obvious.
We conclude this introductory section with a few simple examples.
Example:
A linear utility function. Let
o:s; a < 00.
Intuitively, an agent with this utility function gains nothing by saving for the future and, because of the discount factor, stands to lose by doing so. Indeed, the unique optimal stationary plan 71" corresponds to the consumption function
An agent with this plan and initial wealth s will consume s on the first day, and the daily income on each day thereafter. Hence, It is easy to check that 1(71") satisfies the optimality equation (Theorem 1.2(c)). Hence, "is optimal. Uniqueness follows from the fact that, for each s, only a = c(s) = s achieves the supremum in the optimality equation. 
Example
To check that w satisfies that optimality equation, consider the function
o::; a ::; s.
It suffices to show that <p has its maximum at a = s. 
It can be shown that IT is optimal in complete generality (cf. Appendix). However, we will only consider here the special case when the income variable Y has the Bernoulli distribution
. It can be seen that, in this simple case, the return function I( IT) for the plan IT is given by
on the integers, and by linear interpolation between them:
Furthermore, the resulting Markov chain
has a unique invariant probability measure fL = {fLj }~l' concentrated on the nonnegative integers as follows:
In the above, we have set
To see that rr is optimal, it suffices, by Theorem 2.2(c) to show that and a unique invariant probability measure fL, which satisfies fLo = (1 -
TI(rr) = I(rr)
The solution of this system is given by (2.18). More precisely, the chain starts out in so, and stays in the lattice N x until the first time it visits the origin (which is almost surely finite); from that time onward, the chain remains in No. It is thus clear that the probability measure It of (2.18) is the invariant measure for this case as well.
The Basic Recursion Formula
In order to establish properties of the value function V, we will first show that many properties of u are inherited by the functions V n given by the recursion (2.12). To do this, we introduce a general recursion formula 
A.3: u'(O) = w'(O).
Notice that we write u'(O) and w'(O) for the derivatives from the right at O. Likewise, we say that a function is differentiable on [0,00) if it is differentiable on (0,00) with a right derivative at O. For 0 < s < 00 and 0 :::; a :::; s, define 
Our primary goal in this section is to establish the following result.
Proposition:
The function v inherits all the properties assumed for
A secondary goal is to establish a number of properties for the consumption function c. Several of these properties will be used in our proof of the proposition.
Extend w to be C 1 and strictly concave on (-00,00), in such a way that w'(s) --+ +00 as s --+ -00. Then 'lj;s is defined on [0,00), and 'lj;~strictly decreases to -00 as a --+ 00. Thus, by (3. 3) the equation 'lj;~(a) = 0 has a unique solution a = c(s), and the function c is continuous. Hence, (3.6) is continuous also.
c(s) = c(s) 1\ s
3.2 Lemma: Let 0 ::; a ::; Sl < S2. Then (a) 'lj;~2(a+s2 -Sl) < 'lj;~,(a) < 'lj;~2(a),
and because u' is strictly decreasing,
(b) By (a) and the definition of c(sl),'lj;~2(c(sd) > 'lj;~,(C(Sl» 2: O. 
Everything follows easily.
If 0 < s· < 00 as in case I of the lemma, then we can write So by (a) and (b), V n increases to a limit V, C n decreases to a limit ;;, and s~decreases to some s. We need to show that;; = c, V = v, and s = s*. To see that v= v, calculate as follows:
The first and last equalities are by the definitions of c and Cn, respectively. '(c(s) 
It is now easy to check that v has the desired properties. o
The Value Function and the Optimal Stationary Plan
In this section, we continue to assume that the utility function u satisfies assumption A.l, and we shall use the techniques of section 3 to study the dynamic programming problem. Here is our main result.
Theorem:
Assume that u satisfies A.I.
(a) The value function V is concave, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable on S. 
This establishes (a) and (c). Now c(s) and s -c(s) are nondecreasing because, by Lemma 3.2, cn(s) and s -Cn(s) are nondecreasing for every n. It follows that c is also continuous. Furthermore, a passage to the limit in (4.1) gives
and, by Theorem 2.2, c corresponds to an optimal stationary plan. Thus, c(s) maximizes
is strictly decreasing in a because u' is strictly decreasing and, by (c), V' is nonincreasing. It follows that c(s) is the unique maximizing value for every s and, therefore, c is the unique optimal stationary plan. This completes the proof of (b). 
Proof: c(s) = s if and only if u'(s) :::: (3EV'(Y).
Here is another property of the optimal stationary plan. 
V(s) =u(c(s)) + (3EV(s -c(s) + Y) :::;u(c(s))+(3u(oo)/(I-(3),
and in the limit as s -> 00~~: 
u'(c(s)) = (3EV'(s -c(s) +Y) > u'(s) on (s*,oo). Therefore, we have

V'(S) = max[u'(s),(3EV'(s -c(s) + Y)
'Is E S. 
JL(A;p) = JL (~A);
A E 8([0,00)).
The Stationary Distribution
Assume that the utility function u satisfies assumption A.l of section 3, and let 1f be the optimal stationary plan with consumption function c given by Theorem 4.1. In this section we assume that the agent uses 1f, and study the resulting Markov chain of successive states of wealth SO,Sl, .. • given by Sn+1 = Sn -c(sn) + Y n , n = 0,1,. ... Our main result is that the chain is positive recurrent, with a stationary distribution JL which can be regarded as an equilibrium distribution of wealth for many independent agents facing the same problem (cf. Remark 7.4).
Theorem:
Under the optimal plan 1f, the Markov chain {sn}::"=o has a unique stationary distribution JL.
0
The proof will be based on the renewal theorem or, more precisely, one of its corollaries (Theorem 3.5, p.153 in Asmussen (1987)).
Let s* E (0,00] be as in Theorem 4.1. If s* = 00, then Sn = Y n for n = 1,2, ... and the stationary distribution is just the common distribution A of the Yn's. So assume, for the rest of this section, that 0 < s* < 00 and define R = [0, SO]. The set R is a regeneration set for the chain, because whenever Sn E R we have c(sn) = Sn and sn+I = Y n + 1 . Thus, whenever the chain visits R, it starts over with initial distribution A. Our theorem will follow from that of Asmussen (1987) , if we show that regenerations occur in finite expected time. Define (5.1) T* := inf{n 2' : 1; Sn E R}, so that T* is the time of the first regeneration and, if So E R, T* is the length of a typical cycle. Theorem 5.1 will follow from the proposition below.
Proposition:
If So is constant, or if So is random and Eso < 00, then ET* < 00.
0
The proof will be given in several lemmas. First, observe that since, by The next idea is that, once the chain reaches [0, s] , it will go on to reach R in a fixed, finite number of periods, with a probability which is bounded away from O. We shall first show that the income variable Y is less than s* with positive probability. Define cO := inf{c > 0; pry 2: cJ = 1}. 
So the process sn-whenever it is to the right of s*-moves at least a distance 0 -s* (to the left) with probability at least a, namely P[sn+l :":: To see this, think of an entry of the process into [0, s] as the start of a "trial," call the trial a "success," if the process goes on to reach [0, s*] within the next N days and call it a "failure" otherwise. Notice that, by lemma 5.6 the probability of success is at least 1] and, in the event of a failure, the process will be at a random state which is stochastically smaller than and thus, in order to prove (5.12), it suffices to establish the analogous property for the random walk of (5.3). since E(17;') < 00 {} E(e) < 00 (cf. Gut (1988) 
Lemma
n;::;l VsE[O,sJ.
To this end, fix an initial position x = n EN, and introduce the stopping time ... ; it is easily seen that the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. We conclude that, for the random walk {Xn};;";o of (5.3), the right-hand side of (5.14) is finite. This proves (5.l{). 
It (5.5f
Now let us recall the setup and the notation of the proof of Proposition 5.2. Repeating the type of reasoning that we employed there, we observe that, by analogy with (5.5), the random variable I:;::(j' Sk (with So = a) is stochastically dominated by a sum of the form
Here T is as in (5.8), and the Wk'S are IID random variables; each of them is equal to Ak with probability 1), and equal to Ak + B k with probability 1 -1),k = 1,2, .... The sequences {Ad);';", {Bk});';" are independent, and consist of IID random variables; A, is distributed like I:f,:o'Sj (with So = a), whereas B, is distributed like I:f=(j'Sj (with So having the distribution of a+ Yo +... YN-')' Obviously E(A,) < 00, and E(B,) < 00 from (5.14)
and Lemma 5.8. Therefore, E(W,) < 00 and ( 7'-' ) 9(a) = Eso=s I: Sk :s; E(T).E(W,) < 00. In this section we consider a utility function which saturates at a finite value. More precisely, we impose the following condition in place of assumption A.1.
B In addition to the properties (1.2), we assume the following: (i) There exists bE (0,00) such that u(x) = u(h) for h:S; x < 00.
(ii) u has a continuous derivative on S = [0,00).
(iii) u' is strictly positive and strictly decreasing on (O,h) .
If the income variable Y is greater than or equal to h with probability one, then the problem is trivial. After the first period, the agent can always attain the maximum possible utility and, consequently, (1-,B) .
Furthermore, the optimal plan is not unique because, for s > h, any action in the interval [h, s] is optimal.
The situation is more interesting if Y is less than h with positive probability. Indeed, the methods of sections 3 and 4 can be adapted to prove all the conclusions of Theorem 4.1 if assumption A.l is replaced by B together with the condition pry < h] > O. (Part (d) of Theorem 4.1 can be strengthened to say 0 < s· < 00.) However, it is no longer true as in Theorem 4.3 that the optimal consumption function c(s) approaches infinity as s --+ 00. It is intuitively clear that c(s) ::; h, and it can be shown that c(s) /' h, as s --+ 00.
The method of section 5 can also be adapted to prove the existence of a unique stationary distribution as in Theorem 5.1 under assumption Band the additional assumption EY < h; furthermore, the additional condition E(y 2 ) = fo OO y2>'(dy) < 00 guarantees that this stationary distribution has a finite first moment). If, instead, EY 2' : h, the Markov chain {sn}::"=o is not positive recurrent, and has no stationary distribution.
Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Consider now an index set I = [0,1] and a non-atomic probability measure </> on B(1); the set I represents an uncountable collection of agents, whereas </> represents the "spatial" distribution of these agents on I. Each agent", E I has a utility function u"'(·) and receives a sequence of random endowments Yt, Y 2 "', •••i these are independent copies of the nonnegative random variable Y", whose distribution we shall denote by>."'. For each '" E I, the utility function u"(·) and the distribution >'''' satisfy the assumptions imposed on them in Theorems 5.1, 5.7.
In particular, if the price P E (0,00) of the non-durable commodity is announced in advance and fixed from period to period, each agent '" E I faces an infinite-horizon discounted dynamic programming problem of the type (2.7), (2.8). For this problem, the value function V"(s;p) and the optimal consumption level C"'(SiP) satisfy, by analogy with (4.3), the Bellman equation According to Theorem 5.7, the Markov chain (7.2)
s~= S~_l-C"(Sn-l;P) +p~"; n = 1,2, ... has then a unique invariant measure J./'(ds;p) with finite first moment, and (7.3) (7.4) [0 c" '(S;P) 
(This last identity merely states the invariance of the measure fl"(·; p), whereas (7.3) follows from (7.2) by taking expectation s, and recalling that Then the endowments {Yn"}"EI for the period t = n are revealed for all the different agents; it is assumed that the total endowment in each period t = n namely (7.6)
is non-random ; in particular,
A new price is then formed, as the ratio of total bid over total endowment:
Finally, the agents receive their endowments ' worth (denominate d in the new price), so that they start the next period t = n + 1 with price p~w) and wealths.
=H' (7.9) S::(w) I S~_l(Wr-C"(B::_l(W) ; Pn_l(W» +Pn(W)Yn"( w), a E I.
This procedure is then repeated ad infinitum.
It should be noted that, with.ro := u(Sft; a E 1) and.rn := u(Sft, yt; a E I, k = 1, ... , n) forn E N, the random variablesp~w),S~(w)(aE I) are measurable with respect to .rn-l and .r n , respectively. Let us also introduce the random measure -:l (7.10) vn ( 
C(S;Pn-l(tV))Vn_l(ds;w)
where Q = JoooYA(dy), and (7.3), (7.4) become (7.12) (7.13)
loOO C(S;P)fL(ds;p)=pQ,
[00 (A-s+c(s.p)) fL(A;p) = 10 A p ' fL(ds;p),
We are now in a position to introduce the notion of a "stationary competitive equilibrium" for the system of interacting agents (strategic market game) described in this section, and to construct such an equilibrium explicitly in terms ofthe invariant measure fLO<, a E I ofthe individual Markov
Chains in (7.2). We deal first with the homogeneous case of Remark 7.1, and then extend that result to the case of countably (Theorem 7.6) and uncountably (Remark 7.7) many homogeneous classes of agents. [0,00» (e.g., Feldman & Gilles (1985) , Proposition 2).
Definition:
Theorem:
In the homogeneous case u'" == u, >'''' == >. ('Va E 1) , for any
given p E (0,00) and with p(.) = p(.;p) the ergodic probability measure of (7.13), the pair (p,p) is a stationary competitive equilibrium and satisfies the equations (1.12), (1.13).
Proof: It suffices to show Pl~P,Vl(-;Y'~p(-;p) . Indeed, from (7.11) and (7.12) we have and from (7.10), (7.9), (7. and from (7.20), (7.9), (7015)', and (7.4)' p,ll(';p) ) is a stationary competitive equilibrium, for every p E (0,00). We omit the (straightforward) details.
Appendix
We shall establish in this section the optimality of the stationary plan 11" of Example 2.5, for the problem treated there, and for an arbitrary sequence of nonnegative random variables Y" 1'2, ....
In order to set the stage for these investigations, let us consider a random sequence (so, so), (s1,e1) , ... with
Let us also look at another sequence (to,d o ),(t1,dll, . .. generated by the same mechanism, but with possibly different initial conditions: Under the inductive assumption do -eo 2: to -So 2: 0, the first two expressions are nonnegative and the third one dominates (to -so) +(3(1-so) + (1 -to) = (1 +(3)(1 -so) 2: 0, as we are in case (C); thus, the expression of (A.5) is nonnegative. (eo -do) + ;3(1-so) + (1 -to) ; (C) Thanks to the assumption eo-do:::: to-so:::: 0, the first term is nonnegative, the second dominated (1-;3)(to-so) :::: 0, whereas the third one dominated (to -so) -;3(1 -so) + (1 -to) = (1-;3)(1 -so) :::: O. Consequently, the expression of (A.6) is nonnegative. 0
Suppose now that we start at So :::: 0, and employ the strategy 11';
schematically.
(A.7)
11' _ [SO,S1 = So -c(so) +Yr,SZ""J ,eo -do = u(so) -u(co)~0, and (A.14) follows again from Lemma A.1.
Page 30: Eq. (7.2), add a subscript "n" after y" (7.2) " " "( ) y." Sn = Sn-l -C Sn-ljp +P n; n = 1,2, ... Before Eq. (7.9), "Finally, the agents...with price p~w) and wealths should read Finally, the agents receive their endowments' worth (denominated in the new price), so that they start the next period t = n + 1 with price pn (w) and wealths Equation (7.9) (replace "+" with "=" after S:;(w)
Please observe that from Page 30 on the character "w" was substituted for "w," for many equations-some "w" remain, and should be clear from context. 
